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Deere Right-to-Repair Settlement Signals Antitrust Risk for OEMs and Dealers

July 29, 2026
7 minute read

Deere Right-to-Repair Settlement Signals Antitrust Risk for OEMs and Dealers

July 29, 2026
7 minute read

Authored By

Nicholas Bezier

Nicholas J. Bezier

Allison Reimann

Allison W. Reimann

On July 8, 2026, the Federal Trade Commission and five states, including Wisconsin, announced a proposed settlement in Federal Trade Commission et al. v. Deere & Company. Under the proposed settlement, major agricultural equipment manufacturer, John Deere (Deere), must provide agricultural equipment owners and independent repair providers (IRPs) with the same equipment repair resources that Deere provides to its authorized dealers. Deere also will be subject to regulatory oversight for at least ten years.

The proposed settlement, which is in addition to Deere’s $99 million class action settlement announced in April, underscores the antitrust risk to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and their dealers from the growing Right to Repair movement. It also should cause OEMs to more closely evaluate how they structure their service networks and what repair resources they make available to customers and IRPs outside authorized service networks.

Background

In early 2025, the Federal Trade Commission and five state attorneys general filed a lawsuit against Deere in the United States District Court of the Northern District of Illinois. The FTC and states alleged that Deere restricted the distribution of its Service ADVISOR tool—purportedly necessary to diagnose and repair electronic faults on Deere’s “increasingly computerized” equipment—to authorized Deere dealers. In doing so, the FTC and states asserted that Deere, through its dealers, shut out IRPs, prevented owners from repairing Deere products themselves, and forced owners to rely on service through authorized Deere dealers instead of through IRPs of their choice. According to the FTC and the states, Deere monopolized the market for repairs in violation of federal and state antitrust law, which allowed Deere to impose excessive service prices than if Deere made the Service ADVISOR tool available to owners and IRPs. The FTC and states sought an order requiring Deere to make its fully functional diagnostic and repair tools available to owners and independent repair providers on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms, along with declaratory and injunctive relief, state civil penalties, attorneys’ fees, and other relief necessary to restore competition. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied a motion for judgment on the pleadings by Deere and the parties had started discovery when they reached their settlement.

The action against Deere is a small part of the broader Right to Repair movement. The Right to Repair movement advocates giving product owners and independent repair providers meaningful access to the parts, tools, software, manuals, diagnostic information, and technical support needed to maintain and repair products. Supporters argue that manufacturer restrictions can increase repair costs, delay service, reduce consumer choice, and steer work toward authorized service networks. Manufacturers often respond that broader access may create risks involving safety, cybersecurity, emissions compliance, intellectual property, warranty administration, and product integrity. The movement has produced legislation, regulatory action, and private litigation across industries involving increasingly software-dependent products. As illustrated by the action against Deere, for manufacturers and dealers, the central issue is no longer simply whether repair resources are available, but whether access is practical, affordable, and comparable to the resources provided within authorized networks.

The Proposed Settlement

Under the proposed settlement, Deere must:

  • Make repair resources equivalent to those Deere makes available to Deere authorized dealers available to equipment owners and IRPs on fair and reasonable terms, subject to a rollout schedule;
  • Make available future repair resources to agricultural equipment owners and IRPs when such resources are available to a majority of Deere dealer locations;
  • Instruct its authorized dealers to sell their repair resources to any agricultural equipment owner and IRP that requests them, promote the availability of repair resources, support the use of resources by owners and IRPs, and not discriminate or retaliate against owners or IRPs that purchase or use those resources;
  • Notify the public, agricultural equipment owners, IRPs, and Deere’s authorized dealers about the terms of the settlement.

If approved, the settlement will remain in place for ten years (with potential extension if Deere violates the settlement terms), during which time Deere must make periodic reports to the FTC and states demonstrating compliance. Deere also agreed to permit the FTC and states the ability to inspect Deere’s business records related to settlement compliance on five days’ notice and to interview its directors, officers, and employees to confirm continued compliance.

Deere’s settlement with the FTC and states comes on the heels of a settlement in a separate antitrust class action brought by equipment owners making similar claims. Deere agreed to pay $99 million to purchasers of large Deere agricultural equipment.

Takeaways

  • “Available” is not enough if access is impractical. The order does not merely require Deere to offer repair resources; it requires access on “fair and reasonable terms,” considering pricing factors including dealer net cost, Deere’s cost to prepare and distribute the item, other manufacturers’ pricing, the ability of owners and IRPs to afford the item, distribution method, usage, and inflation. In addition to reviewing whether repair resources are available to the public, an OEM should also consider whether the pricing of the resources is appropriate, and whether it is imposing burdensome or unnecessary credentialing to access the resources. High prices to license or purchase repair resources, undue credentialing, or slow onboarding could be challenged as making repair resources only nominally available.
     
  • Dealer conduct can become evidence against the OEM. The order requires Deere to instruct dealers to promote and support repair resources, sell them to owners and IRPs on request, and not discriminate or retaliate against customers or IRPs who use those resources instead of dealer repair services. An OEM’s antitrust exposure may turn not only on its written policies, but also on how its dealers implement them in practice. The refusal by authorized dealers to sell repair tools, delay in providing access to those resources, disparaging statements about independent repair, or adverse treatment in parts, financing, warranty, or service may be cited as evidence that the OEM’s distribution system is discouraging self-repair or steering repair work back to the authorized network. OEMs should therefore pair any repair-access policy with clear dealer instructions, training, complaint-escalation procedures, and periodic monitoring for inconsistent practices. OEMs should document how complaints against dealers are investigated and corrected, because an unaddressed pattern of dealer conduct may be portrayed as tolerated, encouraged, or effectively adopted by the OEM.
     
  • Dealers should compete on service quality, not tool control. Authorized dealers retain meaningful competitive advantages, including factory training, product expertise, warranty administration, parts availability, specialized equipment, and direct access to OEM support. But dealers should not assume that exclusive access to diagnostic software, technical information, or specialized tools will remain a lawful or durable basis for protecting service revenue. As right-to-repair obligations expand, dealers may be required to sell or support repair resources for owners and independent repair providers (as Deere dealers will be under the settlement), even when doing so facilitates competition with the dealer’s own service department. Dealers should therefore focus on advantages that IRPs may be less able to replicate, such as faster response times, reliable repairs, field-service capacity, preventive-maintenance programs, warranty coordination, and strong customer relationships. They should also train employees not to obstruct access, disparage independent repair, or treat customers differently because they choose to perform repairs themselves or use an IRP, because that conduct may create risk for both the dealer and the OEM.
     
  • No decision on Deere’s justifications for limited distribution of specialized repair tools. If approved, the proposed settlement will prevent the court from weighing in on whether there are procompetitive justifications for Deere’s differential access to specialized repair tools for dealers and the public. For example, OEMs often consider specialized repair tools as proprietary technology. Unlike equipment owners or independent repair providers, authorized dealers are bound by contract and subject to OEM controls to protect the OEM’s intellectual property and brand value. This is one potential justification for different treatment between dealers and owners/IRPs that will remain undecided because of this settlement.

For more information on this settlement, or to evaluate further how it may affect your business, contact a member of our Antitrust or Distribution & Dealership Litigation practices.

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